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Abstract 
 
Singapore has developed a unique housing system, with three-quarters of its housing stock 
built by the Housing & Development Board (HDB) and homeownership financed through 
Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings. As a result, the country’s homeownership rate of 
90% is one of the highest among market economies. At different stages of its economic 
development, the Government of Singapore was faced with a different set of housing 
problems. An integrated land–housing supply and financing framework was established in 
the 1960s to solve the severe housing shortage. By the 1990s, the challenge was that of 
renewing aging estates and creating a market for HDB transactions. Housing subsidies in 
the form of housing grants were also introduced. Recent challenges include curbing 
speculative and investment demand, as well as coping with increasing income inequalities 
and an aging population. These have brought about carefully crafted macroprudential 
policies, targeted housing grants, and schemes to help elderly households monetize their 
housing equity. This paper analyzes key pillars of the housing policy, specifically land 
acquisition, the HDB–CPF system, the role of markets, housing market interventions, the 
Ethnic Integration Policy, and the Lease Buyback Scheme. It concludes with lessons learned 
for other countries. 
 
JEL Classification: R21, R31, R38
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, Singapore’s population was 5.54 million, of which 3.38 million were citizens, 0.53 
million were permanent residents, and 1.63 million were foreigners. One-fifth of its land area 
of 719 square kilometers (km2) comprised reclaimed land (Table 1). Land scarcity and high 
population density (over 7,600 persons per km2) provide justification for the dominance of 
the state in land ownership and housing provision, and the high level of intervention in the 
housing sector. The homeownership rate for the resident population has been above 90% 
since the early 1990s. Among resident employed households, the 2014 median household 
income from work was S$8,292 per month,1 or S$99,504 per year.2 The median house type 
is a four-room (approximately 90 m2) flat sold by the Housing & Development Board (HDB), 
the government housing agency, on a 99-year leasehold basis. The median house price 
(market values) to annual household income ratio for 2015 was estimated at 5.0 
(Demographia 2016). 
Table 1: Population, Land Area, and Density of Singapore, 1970–2015 
Year Land Area 
(km2) 
Population 
Density  
(per km2 ) 
Total 
Population 
Singapore 
Residents 
Proportion of 
Foreigners  
(%) 
1970 586 3,540 2,074,507 2,013,563 3 
1980 618 3,906 2,413,945 2,282,125 5 
1990 633 4,814 3,047,132 2,735,868 10 
2000 683 5,897 4,027,887 3,273,363 19 
2010 712 7,130 5,076,732 3,771,721 26 
2015 719 7,698 5,535,002 3,902,690 29 
km2 = square kilometer.  
Source: Government of Singapore, Department of Statistics. 
Table 1 shows the increase in population and its changing composition by nationality status. 
The foreign component of Singapore’s population has increased significantly, from 10% in 
1990 to 19% in 2000, and was 29% in 2015. Permanent residents (who are not citizens) 
accounted for another 10% and citizens comprised 61% of the population in 2015. These 
statistics on changes in population composition are relevant for housing policy as the 
housing market in Singapore is highly segmented according to households’ nationality 
status. 
In the decades since the first elections were held in 1959 for self-government and since 
independence in 1965, Singapore has been ruled by the People’s Action Party (PAP). The 
successful public housing program is “a foundation stone upon which … the PAP … builds 
its legitimacy among Singaporeans” (Chua 1997, preface). The unique housing system has 
75% of the housing stock in 2015 classified as “public housing” built predominantly by the 
HDB; 82% of the resident population live in HDB estates, of which 79% lived in HDB-sold 
flats. Demand for homeownership is driven by the housing pension fund system introduced 
in 1968 when Central Provident Fund (CPF) savings were allowed to be used for down 
payment and mortgage payments for HDB flats.  
The HDB–CPF framework established in the 1960s has transformed the urban form of 
Singapore and remains largely intact 5 decades on. Between 1960 and 2013, the ratio of 
housing investment to gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 7%, with the ratio of housing 
investment to total investment averaging 23% (Figure 1). These ratios are high by 
1 Statistics are from Singapore government agency websites and Singapore Department of Statistics (2015).  
2 The exchange rate on 5 February 2016 was S$1.41 ≡ US$1.00. 
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international standards and reflect the policy attention and resources channeled into the 
housing sector.   
Figure 1: Housing Investment Ratios in Singapore, 1960–2013  
(%) 
 
GDP = gross domestic product, HI = housing investment, I = total investment.  
Data source: Government of Singapore, Department of Statistics website. 
HDB rental and direct purchases (one unit per household) are restricted to citizens, with 
current monthly gross household income caps at S$1,500 for rental and S$12,000 for direct 
purchase, respectively. The Executive Condominium scheme, a hybrid public–private 
housing scheme for citizen households, has a household income cap of S$14,000. The 
resale HDB sector is available to citizens and Singapore permanent residents (SPRs). 
However, the HDB housing grants are made by taking into account to citizenship, marital 
status, and household income of purchaser households. The private housing sector is 
dominated by transactions by higher-income Singapore citizens, SPRs, expatriates, and 
foreign investors. Table 2 shows the distribution of resident households by dwelling type and 
average monthly household incomes. Of the 1.2 million resident households in 2014, 80% 
resided in HDB-built flats. 
Table 2: Resident Households by Dwelling Type and Household Income in Singapore, 
2014 
Dwelling Type 
Resident 
Households 
Average Monthly Household 
Income from Work among 
Resident Employed Households 
(S$) 
Total 1,200,000 = 100%  
Total HDB 80.4%  
1- and 2-room flats  5.3% 2,313 
3-room flats 18.3% 5,805 
4-room flats 32.2% 8,293 
5-room and executive flats 24.4% 11,606 
Private House Types   
Condominiums and other 
apartments 13.5% 19,843 
Landed properties 5.8% 27,363 
 
HDB = Housing & Development Board.  
Note: Average HDB flat sizes estimated from 2015 resale transaction data: 1-room 33 m2; 2-room 45 m2; 3-room 73 
m2; 4-room 96 m2; 5-room 115 m2. Private housing has much wider variation in sizes and amenities. 
Source: Government of Singapore, Department of Statistics (2015). 
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The housing policy in Singapore has evolved over time in response to different housing 
challenges. Phang (2015c, 12) states that “in the 1960s, the political turbulence of self-
government, merger with Malaysia, and unexpected independence were not conducive to 
attracting long-term investments. On the housing front, the government was faced with a 
largely immigrant and growing population, a chronic housing shortage as well as insufficient 
private-sector resources and capacity to provide adequate solutions.” Measures that had 
previously been undertaken by the British colonial government in town planning and the 
provision of rental houses and flats proved wholly inadequate. Public housing built by the 
Singapore Improvement Trust (SIT) 3  housed 8.8% of the population by 1959, with the 
majority living in overcrowded prewar rent-controlled apartments lacking access to water and 
modern sanitation. Others faced housing conditions comparable to today’s slums. Given this 
lack of adequate housing, the newly elected government made it a priority to provide homes 
on a large scale. The government developed its housing policies based on three pillars: the 
establishment of the HDB in 1960, the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act in 1966, and 
the expansion of the role of the CPF to become a housing finance institution in 1968. 
By the 1970s, the HDB–CPF housing framework, representing a tightly integrated land–
housing supply and financing system, was working effectively to channel resources into the 
housing sector. With the HDB–CPF system in place, the housing shortage was resolved by 
the 1980s. In the 1990s, the challenge was that of renewing aging estates and of creating a 
market for HDB transactions as households upgraded to larger flats and private housing. 
Housing subsidies on the demand side in the form of housing grants were also introduced. 
The more recent (since 2000) housing policy challenges include the need to curb the 
speculative and investment housing demand, the increase in income inequalities, as well as 
an aging population. These have brought about the introduction of carefully crafted 
macroprudential policies, targeted housing grants to assist low- and middle-income 
households, and schemes to help elderly households monetize their housing equity.4  
Sections 2–7 of this paper analyze the key pillars of Singapore’s housing policy, specifically 
land acquisition, the HDB–CPF system of homeownership, the role of the market, housing 
market interventions, the ethnic integration policy, the land lease system, and the Lease 
Buyback Scheme. Section 8 concludes with lessons learned for other Asian countries.  
2. THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1966 
Singapore, a former British colony, held its first general elections as a fully self-governing 
state in 1959, joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, and became an independent 
republic in 1965. The housing situation prior to independence was one of acute shortage, 
resulting in overcrowding, misery, slums, and squatter settlements. It was during such a 
period of political uncertainty and housing crisis that legislation and amendments for urban 
and housing sector transformations were passed. Recognizing that the prerequisite for a 
successful public housing program was the availability of inexpensive land, the government 
paid much attention to amending legislation on land acquisition by the state from the early 
1960s. The Land Acquisition Act of 1966 was a crucial step in Singapore’s housing policies 
and economic development and has had major redistribution effects (Phang 1996, 2015a).    
  
3 See Phang (1992, Chapter 3) for a description of the SIT and other public sector agencies involved in housing 
development in the 1960s and 1970s.  
4 See Phang (1992, 2007, 2015c) for historical accounts and updates of housing policies. 
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In 1964, the Land Acquisition Bill was debated in the legislative assembly while Singapore 
was a part of the Federation of Malaysia. Then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew explained that 
the approach to determining compensation for land acquired by the government should be 
the prevention of economic windfalls to landowners (Singapore Parliamentary Reports, 10 
June 1964):  
“First, that no private landowner should benefit from development which had taken 
place at public expense; and secondly, the price paid on the acquisition for public 
purposes should not be higher than what the land would have been worth had the 
Government not contemplated development generally in the area.”5 
On the matter of land acquisition, the views expounded by the Prime Minister were, 
however, inconsistent with Article 13 of the Malaysian Constitution, which provides for the 
right to adequate compensation in the event of compulsory acquisition. Upon independence 
in August 1965, the Singapore Parliament adopted all the provisions of the Malaysian 
Constitution regarding fundamental rights except for Article 13.  
The Land Acquisition Act, enacted in 1966, gives the state broad powers to acquire land: 
(a) for any public purpose; 
(b) by any person, corporation or statutory board, for any work or an undertaking 
which, in the opinion of the Minister, is of public benefit or of public utility or in the 
public interest; or 
(c) for any residential, commercial or industrial purposes. 
Landowners cannot object to the decision, and appeals on compensation can only be made 
to an Appeals Board and not to the courts. Initially, almost all legal owners appealed the 
compensation awards and, in 1973, the concept of a statutory date was introduced. In the 
words of the Prime Minister (K.Y. Lee 2000, 118–119):  
“Later, I further amended the law to give the government the power to acquire land 
for public purposes at its value on a date fixed at 30 November 1973. I saw no 
reason why private landowners should profit from an increase in land value brought 
about by economic development and the infrastructure paid for with public funds.” 
Between 1975 and 1990, the annual GDP growth rate averaged 8%. The private housing 
price index grew at an average real rate of 10% per year. Land prices would have increased 
by much more than housing prices. Many private landowners were, however, unable to avail 
themselves of this high rate of return as the government acquired land not at market prices 
but at compensation fixed at the lower of 1973 prices or market values for most of that 
period. Compensation was capped at 1973 levels for about 14 years between 1973 and 
1987, with no allowance being made for market valuation or the landowner’s purchase price. 
Exceptions were made on a case-by-case basis.  
Singapore has since moved to a more market-based approach for compensation of acquired 
land. Subsequent amendments to the Land Acquisition Act changed the statutory date for 
purposes of valuation for compensation to 1 January of 1986, 1992, and 1995. In 2007, the 
use of a historical statutory date was removed by Parliament, and compensation has since 
been pegged to full market value.  
State land, as a proportion of total land, grew from 44% in 1960 to 76% by 1985, and was 
about 90% by 2005.6 A significant portion of the increase in state land can be attributed to 
land reclamation. Land acquisition was an important step in Singapore’s housing policies. 
However, it meant that existing owners had to be expropriated. In most other countries, such 
clearance would have encountered strong resistance by dwellers. This was also the case in 
5 See also Centre for Liveable Cities (2014, 12–18).  
6 Phang (1992: 24) and Singapore Land Authority website (http://sla.gov.sg; accessed on 25 Oct 2005). 
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1960s Singapore when resettlement was initially viewed with hostility and suspicion (Centre 
for Liveable Cities 2014, 21). To overcome resistance, the government’s policy was to 
provide suitable alternative accommodation for all businesses and persons affected by its 
land acquisition programs. Planners at that time estimated that for every slum structure 
demolished then, seven new flats were required to relocate families affected (Choe 1975). 
This meant that the processes for public housing construction, land acquisition, slum 
clearance and resettlement, and urban renewal in Singapore were closely interrelated. Chua 
(1997, 132) shows how commitment to universal provision of housing “allowed the PAP 
government to take the strong moral high ground on acquisition of land for public housing.” 
A detailed study of land acquisition and resettlement can be found in Centre for Liveable 
Cities (2014). The study highlights several reasons for the relative success of land 
acquisition and resettlement in Singapore as compared with obstacles and resistance in 
other countries. These included the following factors: 
(i) Legal and constitutional mandate as well as clear processes in the form of the Land 
Acquisition Act that established legitimacy and the rule of law in the conduct of public 
officials carrying out these duties. 
(ii) Meticulous and detailed processes for record keeping and calculation of 
compensation for squatters’ assets at market value. 
(iii) The superiority of alternative accommodation, business premises, and environments 
offered by the government to affected people to replace the land or property that had 
been taken from them—although squatters had no legal interest in the affected land, 
they were compensated for improvements (such as shacks, vegetable plots, and 
livestock) and were also given priority allocation of new land in the case of farmers or 
HDB flats. 
(iv) Effective forward planning and coordination to ensure smooth resettlement due 
largely to the integrated housing, resettlement, and estate planning functions of the 
HDB because the Resettlement Department was housed within the HDB from 1963. 
Subsidiary legislation in the form of the State Land Rules, 1968 provided that titles for state-
owned land should be for terms not exceeding 99 years. Through the Land Acquisition Act, 
the government cleared low-density housing, slums, villages, and squatter areas, and 
assembled land parcels. State land was leased to government agencies for the development 
of high-rise “public” housing which were sold on a 99-year leasehold basis to eligible 
households, as well as for the development of industrial estates, educational institutions, and 
other urban public amenities. Up to half of the land acquired by the state since the 
enactment of the act has been allocated for housing development by both the public and 
private sectors (Phang 1996).  
Singapore’s land policies can be described as land reform in an urban setting. It involved a 
massive transfer of land resource from private landowners to the state in the first 2 decades 
after independence. That large plots of land in Singapore were owned by a small number of 
wealthy landowners during the 1960s helped explain why acquiring land from this group was 
regarded as fair by Parliament (Centre for Liveable Cities 2014, 7).7 Chua (1997, 134) writes 
that “the popularity of the government’s action among the overwhelming propertyless 
electorate enabled it to bear the rejection of this very small minority.” The major acquisition 
and redistribution of a critical resource contributed to the development of industrial estates, 
the financial district, commercial developments, the large public housing program, and public 
sector infrastructure development. The Land Acquisition Act of 1966 thus underpinned the 
successful economic development of Singapore (Phang 1996). 
7 Large agricultural plots outside the city were owned by wealthy individuals and British private companies. 
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Public land leasing for private sector development generally falls under the term Government 
Land Sales in Singapore.8 Much urban redevelopment in Singapore has been achieved 
through this land sales program, administered mainly by the Urban Redevelopment Authority 
and, to a lesser extent, the HDB. Under the program, the government amalgamated or 
reclaimed land, inserted infrastructure, provided planning and urban design guidelines, and 
released the land for sale to private (including foreign) developers (Phang 2005). Sites are 
usually sold on 99-year leases for commercial, hotel, and private residential development, 
whereas leases for industrial sites are usually for 60 years or less. The lease tenure for other 
types of sites varies depending on the uses. The usual sale method is through public tender.  
Proceeds from land sales do not constitute part of the government’s operating revenue but 
are instead channeled into government reserves. Singapore’s public wealth is estimated to 
be more than 2.5 times its GDP. These are the net assets of the two sovereign wealth funds 
(Temasek Holdings and the Government Investment Corporation) and the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore. Investment incomes from these institutions contribute to the 
government’s annual operating revenue. 
3. THE HDB–CPF HOUSING FRAMEWORK  
The HDB is the key pillar of Singapore’s housing system. The achievements of the HDB, 
including its dominant role in Singapore’s housing sector, have been extensively 
documented elsewhere.9 This section draws from the existing literature and provides a brief 
summary of the main features of the framework.  
The HDB began operations on 1 February 1960. It replaced the SIT and was set up as a 
statutory board to provide “decent homes equipped with modern amenities for all those who 
needed them” (Teh 1975, 6). A target of 110,000 dwelling units to be built was set for 1960–
1970. On 25 May 1961, a huge fire broke out in the Bukit Ho Swee squatter district which 
rendered about 16,000 people homeless. Housing the victims of the fire became the HDB’s 
first major challenge. The government compulsorily acquired the burned-out land as a site 
for 12,000 low-cost flats and promised to complete the first blocks of flats within 9 months. 
The first five blocks of flats were completed by February 1962 and all 16,000 people who 
had lost their homes in the fire had been rehoused on the same site by the end of 1964 (see 
Latif 2009, 81–84).10 
In its initial years of operation, the HDB followed the British public housing model of 
providing only rental units. It began offering housing units for sale on 99-year leasehold 
basis from 1964 under its Home Ownership for the People scheme. 11 The HDB priced 
housing units affordably for households with incomes not exceeding S$800 a month and 
offered loans such that owners paid less in monthly mortgage payments than they would 
have done in rents.  
Price subsidies and housing grants are given to eligible households at the point of purchase 
and not deferred. Government support for the HDB is in the form of (i) annual grants from 
the current budget to cover its deficits incurred for development, maintenance, and 
upgrading of estates; (ii) loans for mortgage lending and long-term development purposes; 
and (iii) land allocation for HDB housing and comprehensive HDB town planning.  
8 See Urban Redevelopment Authority web page at https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/land-sales.aspx 
9 Notable government publications include Yeh (1975), Wong and Yeh (1985), Fernandez (2011), and Centre for 
Liveable Cities and HDB (2013). Academic publications include Chua (1997), Phang (1992, 2007, 2013a, 
2015c), and Kim and Phang (2013). 
10 As a consequence of the fire, an amendment was passed to allow land that had been devastated by fire to be 
acquired at not more than one-third of the value of the vacant site, unless the minister specified otherwise. The 
one-third figure was to ensure that landowners did not benefit from an appreciation in the value of their land 
that would then be free from encumbrances. 
11 See references in footnote 9, and HDB website at http://www.hdb.gov.sg 
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The HDB brought about a transformation on the housing supply side. Table 3 shows the rate 
of increase in population and the stock of housing from 1970 to 2015. Housing units 
increased by about 50% in each decade from 1970 to 2000, outstripping population growth. 
In particular, HDB housing displaced private housing as low-density shophouses, squatter 
settlements, and villages were acquired by the government and demolished to make way for 
high-rise flats. The homeownership rate doubled within 1 decade, from 29% in 1970 to 59% 
in 1980, and reached 88% by 1990. From 2000 to 2010, the pace of housing construction 
slowed dramatically and was below the population growth rate of 26% (Table 3).  
Table 3: Housing Stock, Housing Supply, and Homeownership Rate, 1970–2015 
 Population 
(’000) 
Total Housing 
Stock 
HDB 
Housing 
 
Private 
Housing 
Persons per 
Dwelling 
Unit 
HDB 
Dwellings as 
Proportion of 
Housing Stock 
Resident 
Home-
ownership 
Rate 
1970 2,075  305,833  120,138  185,695  6.8  39% 29.4% 
1980 2,414  467,142  337,198  129,944  5.2  72% 58.8% 
1990 3,047  690,561  574,443  116,118  4.4  83% 87.5% 
2000 4,017 1,039,677  846,649  193,028  3.9  81% 92.0% 
2010 5,076  1,156,732  898,532  258,200  4.4  78% 87.2% 
2015 5,535  1,296,304  968,856  327,448  4.3  75% 90.3% 
% Change 
1970–1980 16% 53% 181% –30% –24% 84% 100% 
1980–1990 26% 48% 70% –11% –15% 15% 49% 
1990–2000 32% 51% 47% 66% –12% –2% 5% 
2000–2010 26% 11% 6% 34% 14% –5% –5% 
2010–2015 9% 12% 8% 27% –3% –4% 4% 
HDB = Housing & Development Board. 
Sources: Data from Singapore government publications and websites. 
A major policy innovation in 1968 was for the government to utilize the CPF as a vehicle for 
housing finance. In 1968, a new law was introduced to allow withdrawals from the fund to 
finance the purchase of housing sold by the HDB. Both employers and employees 
contributed a certain percentage of the individual employee’s monthly salary toward the 
employee’s personal and portable account in the fund. When the CPF was established in 
1955, the contribution rate was 10% (5% each by employees and employers) of the monthly 
salary. With the new law in 1968, the contribution rates were raised steadily, and by 1984, 
they were 25% of wages. The contribution rates in 2016 are 20% of wages for employees 
and 17% of wages for employers, up to a monthly salary ceiling of S$6,000.12  
Figure 2 shows a schematic view of the mobilization of domestic savings for housing finance 
through the CPF. Between 1968 and 1981, CPF savings could only be for payments related 
to the purchase of public-sector-built housing (such as down payment or stamp duties). At 
the beginning of the 1980s, the scheme was gradually liberalized, allowing for withdrawals 
for other, non-housing-related purposes, such as medical expenditures. The interest rate on 
CPF Ordinary Account savings yields a minimum of 2.5%.13  
The HDB receives government loans to finance its mortgage lending and pays interest at the 
prevailing CPF savings rate. The HDB uses the loans to provides mortgage loans and 
mortgage insurance to buyers of its leasehold flats (both new and resale). The typical loan 
represents 80% of the price of the flat. The maximum repayment period is limited to 25 
12  For details, see the CPF web page at https://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/employers/employerguides/employer-
guides/paying-cpf-contributions/cpf-contribution-and-allocation-rates. 
13 From 1 January 2008, an extra 1% interest per year is paid on the first S$60,000 of a member’s combined 
balances. See the CPF web page on details of interest rates payable for various accounts at 
https://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Members/AboutUs/about-us-info/cpf-interest-rates. Historical interest rates can be 
found at https://mycpf.cpf.gov.sg/Assets/common/Documents/InterestRate.pdf. 
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years. Every household can apply for a maximum of two HDB loans. The mortgage interest 
rate charged by the HDB is pegged at 0.1 percentage point above the CPF ordinary account 
savings interest rate. (The latter is based on savings rates offered by the commercial banks, 
subject to a minimum of 2.5%.)  
Figure 2: Mobilization of Domestic Savings for Housing through the CPF 
 
CPF = Central Provident Fund, HDB = Housing & Development Board.  
Sources: Modified from Phang (2007, 2013a). 
Table 4 shows data for net assets, contributions, and withdrawals made by CPF members 
as a proportion of GDP for 2014. Net assets of the CPF are 71% of GDP, contributions by 
members comprise 7% of GDP, and net withdrawals are 4% of GDP. Withdrawals for the 
purpose of housing payments dominate and comprised 55% of total net withdrawals.  
The integrated HDB–CPF framework contributed to the growth of housing loans and the 
development of the mortgage sector as homeownership rates increased. The ratio of 
housing mortgage loans to GDP was only 4% in 1970; it increased to 10% by 1980 and to 
62% by 2000. In 2014, the resident households’ housing mortgage loans to GDP ratio was 
55.5%. Between 1970 and 2000, HDB outstanding mortgage loans accounted for more than 
50% of total housing loans (Phang 2001). In 2002, the government amended its policy to 
allow banks instead of the CPF to have first claim on a property should a borrower default on 
his or her mortgage loan (Phang 2003). This paved the way for commercial banks to enter 
the HDB mortgage market from 2003. With the low interest rate environment in recent years, 
commercial banks have been able to offer loans at rates below the HDB mortgage loans’ 
2.6% interest floor. Financial institutions have since increased their share of outstanding 
housing mortgage loans to more than 80% of the total (see Table 4).  
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Table 4: CPF Assets, Contributions and Withdrawals by Purpose, 2014 
 S$ million % of GDP  
GDP 390,089 –  
Resident households’ outstanding mortgage 
loans with financial institutions 179,578 46.0 
Resident households’ HDB mortgages 37,178 9.5 
CPF net assets 277,778 71.2 
CPF contributions by members 27,917 7.2 
CPF total withdrawals (net of refunds)  17,298 4.4 
Purpose of Withdrawal S$ million % of CPF total net 
withdrawals 
HDB housing 6,892 39.8 
Private housing 2,706 15.6 
Attained the age of 55 years* 4,266 24.7 
Medisave and medical insurance 2,162 12.5 
Purchase of life-long annuity 2,069 12.0 
CPF = Central Provident Fund, GDP = gross domestic product.  
* Or leaving Singapore and West Malaysia permanently, as well as on grounds of death or permanent incapacitation. 
Sources: Singapore Department of Statistics and CPF Financial Statements, 2014. 
4. THE ROLE OF MARKETS 
In a heavily state-dominated and highly regulated sector, marketization of HDB flats has 
taken place in phases. In the 1960s and 1970s, when there were long waiting lists for HDB 
flats, the HDB allocated flats with priority given to households affected by resettlement and 
on a first-come-first-served basis for other households. Separate waiting lists were 
maintained for rental and sale flats, and applicants could state their preferred zone and type 
of flat desired. The waiting lists averaged 70,000 households per year between 1971 and 
1985 (Phang 1992, 166). During this period of general shortage, there was policy concern 
that HDB dwellings should not become a vehicle for speculation by allowing the price 
subsidies to be capitalized on a secondary market. There were thus numerous regulations 
concerning the resale of HDB flats which restricted household mobility.  
Restrictions on resale took the following forms: 
- Ban on market transactions prior to 1971: The HDB required owners who wished to sell 
their flats to return them to the HDB at the original purchase price plus the depreciated 
cost of improvements. 
- Minimum occupancy period: In 1971, HDB allowed owners who had resided in their flats 
for a minimum of 3 years to sell their flats at market prices to buyers of their choice who 
satisfied the eligibility requirements for HDB homeownership. The minimum occupancy 
period before resale was increased to 5 years in 1973 and has remained in place since. 
- Debarment period: In 1971, when resale became permitted, those who sold their flat 
were debarred from buying another HDB flat for a year. The debarment period was 
increased to 2.5 years in 1975. The debarment period did not allow for household 
mobility within the HDB sector and was a great deterrent for any household considering 
sale of its dwelling. This was abolished in 1979, thereby greatly facilitating transactions 
within the public housing sector.  
- Resale levies: In 1979, in place of the debarment period, a 5% levy on the transacted 
price of the dwelling was imposed on the seller to “reduce windfall profits.” A system of 
graded resale levies, based on flat type, was introduced in 1982. Rules regarding 
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circumstances under which levies could be waived were fine-tuned in the 1980s. The 
resale levy system in its current form ensures that the subsidy on the second new flat 
purchased by the household from the HDB is smaller than that for the first-time HDB flat 
buyer.  
Only citizens, non-owners of any other residential property, households with a minimum size 
of two persons with household incomes below the income ceiling set by the HDB, were 
eligible to purchase new or resale HDB flats prior to 1989. These rules restricted mobility 
even as household incomes increased. Phang (1992) found that, in 1981, 31% of multiple-
worker HDB households with length of tenure greater than 5 years were no longer eligible to 
purchase HDB flats. The consequence for commuting time was that, on average, workers 
residing in HDB housing commuted greater distances by 2.2 minutes of auto time or 5.6 
minutes of transit time, as compared with those residing in private apartments.  
As the housing shortage eased and households sought to upgrade their housing or change 
their location, there was a need to amend resale regulations on the eligibility of buyers in 
order to facilitate household mobility within the HDB sector, as well as from the HDB to the 
private sector and vice versa. Facilitating the development of a HDB resale market through 
deregulation speeded up in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This could also be considered to 
be in line with the then worldwide trend toward privatization and deregulation.  
The following restrictions on purchasers of HDB resale flats were relaxed in 1989: 
- Income caps for buyers: The income ceiling restriction was removed for buyers of HDB 
resale flats. 
- Nationality status of buyers: Permanent residents were allowed to purchase HDB resale 
flats for owner-occupancy. 
- Private housing ownership: Private housing owners were allowed to purchase HDB 
resale flats for owner-occupancy. HDB flat-owners, who could not own any other 
residential property before, could also invest in private-sector-built dwellings. 
From 1991, single citizens above the age of 35 years were allowed to purchase HDB resale 
flats for owner-occupancy. This was the first instance of HDB’s recognition of the needs of 
single citizens to own their own homes independently.14 In 1993, measures to deregulate 
HDB financing for resale flats were introduced. At that time, the HDB was the only source of 
finance for buyers of resale HDB flats.  
The volume of transactions of resale HDB flats increased from fewer than 800 units in 1979 
to 13,000 units in 1987 and 60,000 units in 1999. The number of resale transactions was 
31,000 in 2004 and 37,000 in 2009; it declined to 17,000 in 2014 (a 10-year low)—a result of 
numerous interventions to “cool” the property market.15 The effects of these policy measures 
on housing prices are further discussed in the next section. 
5. SUPPLY-SIDE VS. DEMAND-SIDE INTERVENTIONS 
Consistent with the shift toward a greater reliance on the market, the government introduced 
CPF housing grants for the purchase of resale HDB flats in 1994. This demand-side policy 
was a shift from the previous supply-side interventions. The subsidy was provided to eligible 
first-time applicant households and deposited in their CPF accounts. The grants, however, 
carried the risk that they could be capitalized into housing prices. The risk was exacerbated 
14 The CPF housing grant was extended to single citizens (age 35 and above) in 1998. Since 2013, eligible single 
citizens above 35 can buy a new 2-room HDB flat direct from the HDB. They may also apply for Additional and 
Special Housing Grants. See: http://www.hdb.gov.sg/cs/infoweb/residential/buying-a-flat/new/single-singapore-
citizen-scheme   
15 Resale volume data from HDB Annual Reports and HDB website at: 
http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10321p.nsf/w/BuyResaleFlatNumberofResaleApplications?OpenDocument 
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by the simultaneous deregulation of the resale market, in particular the removal of the 
income ceiling and citizenship restrictions, and the resale HDB prices indeed started to 
increase. Figure 3 shows the rate of increase in price indices for both private housing and 
HDB resale flats from 1991. Following housing finance deregulation in 1993, HDB resale 
prices increased sharply (by 71%) within the same year. The HDB resale prices rose further 
after the introduction of CPF housing grants in 1994. This price increase had to be expected, 
because resale public and private housing markets had become less segmented since high-
income citizens as well as permanent residents could purchase HDB resale flats.  
Figure 3: Changes in Housing Price Indices, 1991–2015 
 
HDB = Housing & Development Board.  
Sources: Data from Urban Redevelopment Authority and HDB websites. 
The government reacted by an increase in the HDB supply of new housing, the introduction 
of a new Executive Condominium scheme, as well as an increase in government land sales 
for private housing development. However, the housing prices continued to soar, with HDB 
resale price increases much higher than private housing price increases in the 1993, 1995, 
and 1996 (Figure 3). To bring prices down, the government introduced a package of anti-
speculation measures on 15 May 1996. These measures included capital gains taxes on the 
sale of any property within 3 years of purchase, stamp duty on every sale and subsale of 
property, limitation of housing loans to 80% of property value, as well as limiting foreigners to 
non-Singapore-dollar-denominated housing loans. The HDB also changed various 
regulations to bring demand down, such as limiting HDB flat buyers to two loans from the 
HDB where there had been no limit before.  
The effects of these measures coincided with the onset of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 
and housing prices fell sharply. The decline in HDB resale prices was less than the decline 
in private housing prices in 1998. In order to avoid too steep a fall, the government stopped 
land sales and reduced stepwise the CPF housing grants. As a consequence, both the 
private and public housing sectors were confronted with a situation of unsold units. As 
described in Phang (2007), in early 2002, the HDB suspended its Registration for Flats 
(queuing) System and ensured that new flats were only built when there was sufficient 
demand for them. Other major restructuring measures followed, which resulted in a sharp 
curtailment of the HDB building program; from 2000 to 2010, the number of HDB dwelling 
units increased by a mere 6% (Table 3).  
During the global financial crisis of 2008, HDB prices were remarkably resilient and 
continued to increase while private housing prices fell. In the post-2008 global financial crisis 
period, limited supply, rapid population increase, the low interest rate environment, and high 
global liquidity, resulting from accommodative monetary policies of central banks in 
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developed economies, led to accelerated price increases of Singapore property. Over the 
decades, the upward trend in Singapore real estate prices had caused housing (both HDB 
and private) to be viewed as an attractive investment class as compared with other asset 
classes. This view has been reinforced by official statements from the government that HDB 
flats are assets which it commits “to upgrade” and “whose value can be unlocked for 
retirement, if needed” (Ministry of National Development 2011b). This approach raises 
intergenerational equity implications and questions about the longer-term sustainability of 
relying on appreciating house prices to finance retirement (Phang 2012).  
The continuous upward trend in prices and the economic and political risks of a housing 
bubble and increasingly unaffordable housing compelled the government to intervene. Since 
2006, the Government of Singapore has announced several consecutive rounds of “cooling” 
measures to curb investment demand for housing. Over the same period, to enhance 
housing affordability, housing grants which allowed the HDB to better price-discriminate 
based on household incomes became a feature of the HDB pricing policy. As eligibility for 
HDB new subsidized flats and CPF Housing Grants (of S$40,000) extended to over 80% of 
Singapore citizen households, subsidies needed to be better calibrated to household 
incomes.  
The Additional CPF Housing Grant (AHG) was introduced in 2006 (and enhanced in 2007 
and 2009) to allow families with lower incomes to receive a higher grant amount which could 
be used for either a new flat or a resale flat. The amount of the AHG depends on the 
average gross monthly household income. Households with monthly household incomes 
less than S$5,000 are eligible for the AHG. The AHG ranges from S$5,000 (for households 
with incomes from S$4,501 to S$5,000) to S$40,000 (for households with incomes below 
S$1,500).  
The Special Housing Grant (SHG) was introduced in 2011 to help households buy four-room 
or smaller new flats in non-mature estates directly from the HDB. The SHG was enhanced in 
2012, significantly expanded in 2013, and expanded again in 2015.16 The amount of the 
SHG depends on the average gross monthly household income. Households with household 
incomes less than S$8,500 per month are eligible for the grant. The amount of the grant 
ranges from S$5,000 for households with incomes from S$8,000 to S$8,500, to S$40,000 for 
households with incomes below S$5,000.   
A Step-Up Housing Grant (of S$15,000) was introduced in 2013 to help families in 
subsidized two-room HDB flats in non-mature estates upgrade to purchase three-room HDB 
flats in non-mature estates. The net effect of these several housing grants is to allow the 
HDB to price its flats based on a household’s ability-to-pay thus ensuring that almost all 
employed citizens can afford to own a home.  
From independence, homeownership affordability has always been a very visible symbol of 
the government’s “ability to fulfil its promise to improve the living conditions of the entire 
nation” (Chua 1997, 139). The ratio of the price of a new HDB four-room flat to median 
household income was generally 4.0 or less prior to 2005 (Phang 2009, 2010). HDB resale 
prices are generally higher than new flat prices as they are market-determined and there is 
no waiting period for construction to be completed. Figure 4 shows the ratio of the median 
HDB 4-room flat resale price to median resident employed household annual income. The 
ratio was generally below 4.5 prior to 2008 and rose to above 5.0 from 2010 to 2012. As 
prices in the HDB resale market rose, new HDB flat prices followed a similar trend, 
outstripping income growth. Although the median-income household would be able to easily 
afford a new HDB five-room flat in a new town location at around 4 times the annual income 
in 2006, the price had increased to closer to 6 times the annual income by 2011 (Phang 
16 In August 2015, the government increased the maximum grant amount from S$20,000 to S$40,000. The 
income ceiling for households to qualify to receive the SHG was raised from S$6,500 to S$8,500.  
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2012). The introduction of new housing grants enhanced affordability but contributed to 
house price increases during the period when new HDB housing supply was minimal.  
Moreover, what is affordable may not be available, as new HDB build-to-order (BTO) 
projects were reportedly oversubscribed (e.g., by up to 5 times in a February 2011 exercise). 
Dissatisfaction over rising prices and difficulties in securing HDB housing were among the 
factors that contributed to a 6% swing in votes against the PAP in the May 2011 elections 
(from the 2006 elections) to 60%, its lowest since independence. The opposition Workers’ 
Party won six seats in Parliament, including a Group Representation Constituency of five 
seats, the first time a Group Representation Constituency had been won by an opposition 
party. In what may be interpreted as a response to these developments, the government 
increased the household income ceiling for the purchase of new HDB flats from S$8,000 a 
month to S$10,000 a month in August 2011 (Ministry of National Development 2011a). The 
income ceiling for eligibility to purchase an Executive Condominium was also increased, 
from S$10,000 to S$12,000. In August 2015, the government further increased the monthly 
household income ceilings from S$10,000 to S$12,000 for purchasing a new HDB flat, and 
from S$12,000 to S$14,000 for a new Executive Condominium (H.L. Lee 2015). These 
changes enable even more young Singaporean households to enjoy housing subsidies for 
homeownership—the median household income among all employed households was 
S$8,292 in 2014 according to the Department of Statistics. 
Figure 4: Median HDB 4-Room Flat Resale Price to Median Household Income Ratio 
 
HDB = Housing & Development Board.  
Sources: Calculated from data from government websites. 
In what can be described as a retreat from the market, new HDB flats have since 2013 been 
offered at prices that are “delinked” from market prices. In 2013, the Minister for National 
Development announced that he aimed to bring down BTO prices from about 5.5 times 
applicant households’ median annual income to 4 times their median annual income. In 
2014, after grants, three-room BTO flats cost 4.57 times the annual median applicant 
households’ annual income (Table 5). Four- and five-room flats were at prices that are at 
5.26 times and 5.36 times applicant households’ annual incomes, respectively (The Straits 
Times, 17 November 2014).  
Numerous measures have been introduced to cool the housing market between 2006 and 
2013. The measures introduced include the following:17 
17 For details of these measures, see Lee et al. (2013) and http://www.srx.com.sg/cooling-measures  
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- Prohibiting developers from allowing purchasers to defer stamp duty and interest 
payments to a later date 
- Prohibition of interest-only housing loans 
- Seller stamp duty  
- Loan-to-value ratio limits 
- Additional buyer stamp duty 
- Tenor restriction limit 
- Three-year waiting period before new SPRs are eligible to purchase resale HDB flats 
- Mortgage service ratio limit 
- Total debt service ratio limit 
Table 5: Price Affordability of HDB Flats in 2014  
HDB Flat 
Type 
Average BTO 
Price 
Average BTO 
Price after Grants 
Applicants’ 
Median Annual 
Household 
Income 
Ratio of Price 
(after Grants) 
to Income 
2-room $110,000 $55,000 $19,200 2.86 
3-room $187,000 $137,000 $30,000 4.57 
4-room $295,000 $265,000 $50,400 5.26 
5-room $386,000 $386,000 $72,000 5.36 
BTO = build-to-order, HDB = Housing & Development Board.  
Note: BTO refers to HDB flats. Prices are for BTO flats in non-mature estates. 
Source: The Straits Times, 17 November 2014. 
With the numerous market intervention measures introduced since 2006, it is difficult to 
isolate the price effects of a particular cooling measure or the extent to which housing grants 
were capitalized (Lee et al. 2013). The measures to cool the market can be viewed as 
macroprudential policies to stabilize housing prices, reduce the returns for housing investors, 
and pre-empt a housing bubble from developing.   
The housing tax and subsidy framework in Singapore is highly progressive. The basic idea is 
that wealthy property owners and investors are taxed and the receipts used to subsidize 
homeownership of lower-income groups. Table 6 provides a simplified picture of the 
progressivity of the housing tax and subsidy framework at the point of purchase. The 
housing wealth redistribution is codified in a complex law. Aiming for a fair and targeted 
outcome, the effective housing subsidy is based on multiple criteria. For example, in 2015, 
the Proximity Housing Grant (PHG) was set up to enhance grants for households purchasing 
a resale HDB flat close to their parents or children.  
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Table 6: Progressivity of Housing Purchase Taxes and Subsidies 
Residency/Incomes/Housing Types Additional Buyer Stamp Duty (+) 
Price Subsidy (–) 
Foreigners 15% 
SPR investors  10% 
Singaporean investors 7% 
SPR homeowners 5% 
Singaporean high-income homeowners 0% 
Executive Condominium –10% 
HDB 5-room –12% 
HDB 4-room –20% 
HDB 3-room –35% 
HDB 2-room –50% 
  HDB = Housing & Development Board, SPR = Singapore permanent resident. 
Note: Estimates of price subsidies based on difference between resale market prices and new flat prices. 
In order to further curb the housing demand, the government has been increasing the supply 
of HDB flats since 2011. With the increase in supply of both HDB and private housing, the 
shortage of housing has started to decline. The government, however, aims to ensure that 
housing remains an attractive investment; one reason being that the wealth of many citizens 
is locked into housing and a sudden fall of housing prices would have considerable negative 
wealth effects. 
6. PROMOTING RACIAL INTEGRATION: THE ETHNIC 
INTEGRATION POLICY 
Singapore hosts citizens from different racial and religious backgrounds. The HDB’s 
objective has always been to integrate the various income and racial groups within the public 
housing program and to avoid the emergence of low-income or ethnic ghettos. This policy 
was a consequence of events in the 1960s, when there were episodes of ethnic violence 
between the Chinese and the Malays that resulted in several deaths and injuries. Racial 
harmony has since been a goal of the government (Ooi, Siddique, and Soh 1993). Beginning 
in the 1970s, the HDB allocated new flats in a manner that would give a “good distribution of 
races” to different new towns. However, by 1988, a trend of ethnic regrouping through the 
resale market was highlighted as a social problem which could lead, over time, to the re-
emergence of ethnic enclaves.  
In 1989, the government implemented an Ethnic Integration Policy under which racial limits 
were set for the HDB blocks and neighborhoods. 18  The Chinese, Malay, Indian/Others 
neighborhood limits were set at 84%, 22%, and 10%, respectively.19 The block quotas were 
3% above each neighborhood limit. For new flats, a particular ethnic group will not be able to 
buy a flat from the HDB if the quota for that group has been reached for the particular block 
or neighborhood (Centre for Liveable Cities and HDB 2013, chapter 5). For the resale 
market, when the set ethnic group limits for a particular block or neighborhood are reached, 
those wishing to sell their HDB flats in the particular block or neighborhood are constrained 
18 Dodge (2006) devotes a chapter to Singapore’s Ethnic Integration Policy in his book on Thomas Schelling. 
Schelling’s models on the neighborhood “tipping” phenomenon that would quickly lead to total segregation of 
different ethnic groups were influential in the Singapore government’s adoption of policies to control the 
movement of population groups in the public housing sector.  
19 In March 2010, in response to changing demographics, the neighborhood limit for Indian/Others was raised to 
12%. 
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to sell them to another household of the same ethnic group. The government had 
emphasized that “our multiracial policies must continue if we are to develop a more 
cohesive, better-integrated society. Singapore’s racial harmony, long-term stability, and even 
viability as a nation depend on it” (quoted in Ooi, Siddique, and Soh 1993, 14).   
The HDB for its housing estates has worked remarkably well in Singapore and has 
contributed to social integration of the different races. In a May 2015 interview, Deputy Prime 
Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam described this policy as “the most intrusive policy in 
Singapore” which “has turned out to the most important.”20   
However, the restriction in selling to the same ethnic group has resulted in some market-
distortionary effects. In a careful study, Wong (2013) matched more than 500,000 names in 
the phone book to ethnicities to calculate ethnic proportions at the apartment block level. 
She then investigated transaction price and time-on-market duration differences for 
constrained and unconstrained blocks using 35,744 transactions between April 2005 and 
August 2006. On average, Wong (2013) found the transaction prices for Chinese 
constrained units to be 5% higher than transactions in comparable unconstrained blocks. 
Conversely, the prices for Malay and Indian constrained units were 3% lower.21 She also 
estimated longer time-on-market durations of between 1 and 1.4 months for constrained 
sellers.  
In March 2010, in response to the increase in the number of SPRs living in public housing 
estates, the HDB introduced a new SPR quota for non-Malaysian SPR families buying flats 
to facilitate better integration and to prevent new SPR enclaves from forming in public 
housing estates. The SPR quota is set at 5% and 8% at the neighborhood and block levels, 
respectively. Malaysian SPR buyers are not subject to the SPR quota as they are 
considered to have close cultural and historical similarities with Singaporeans.22  
7. LAND LEASE SYSTEM AND THE LEASE BUYBACK 
SCHEME 
Land Lease System  
With about 90% of the land owned by the state, all HDB flats and most high-rise private 
condominiums are sold on a 99-year leasehold basis. The limited number of freehold 
properties command a premium over comparable leasehold properties as the value of 
leasehold properties at the termination of the lease is expected to fall to zero. The Singapore 
Land Authority provides a Leasehold Table which expresses the value of the residual tenure 
as a percentage of freehold value of land.23 
Capozza and Sick (1991) have shown that leasehold landowners will redevelop earlier and 
at a lower intensity as compared with freehold owners, because the value of the developed 
20 “An Investigative Interview: Singapore 50 Years after Independence”, 45th St Gallen Symposium, May 2015. 
See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpwPciW74b8. 
21 Using an average price of units sold (S$234,000), Wong (2013) estimated these price differences to represent 
5 times the median monthly income of the Chinese (S$2,335) and 3 times the median monthly income of the 
Malays (S$1,790) and the Indians (S$2,167).    
22 A non-Malaysian SPR household buyer must satisfy both the ethnic proportion and SPR quota to qualify to buy 
a resale HDB flat. The ethnic proportions and SPR quota are updated on the first day of every month and 
buyers/sellers can check the status of a unit online. See HDB web page at 
http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10296p.nsf/PressReleases/C515273FA068DD58482576DD00169155?OpenDocum
ent. 
23 The Leasehold Table is used together with the Table of Development Charge for the computation of differential 
premiums payable when state title restrictions involving change of use and/or increase in intensity of use for 
leasehold land are lifted. See 
http://www.sla.gov.sg/Portals/0/Services/Land%20Lease%20Conditions/DP%20policy%20wef%2031%20Jul%
202000.pdf  
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land at the termination of the lease is lower (or zero) as compared with the freehold case. 
This may represent an unintended consequence of having a housing and land market based 
on a lease structure. However, in the case of Singapore, these lower development intensity 
effects do not exist for land leases sold by the government because the government defines 
the land use, development intensity (plot ratio), and time-to-project completion under the 
Government Land Sales Programme. The detailed planning regulations basically strip away 
development options and reduce the uncertainty linked to the optimal time to exercise the 
real option of land development, thus accelerating investments (Cunningham 2007).  
Another effect of leaseholds is that investment in maintenance for properties may be lower 
as compared with freehold properties. One may hypothesize that a similar argument may 
apply to HDB flats and private leasehold properties: because capital investments are lost 
when the lease expires, there is a disincentive for households to improve—or even hold 
constant—the flat quality. This disincentive may be responsible for the more rapid 
deterioration of the housing stock built on leased land as compared with freehold land.  
In the case of Singapore, as a consequence of rapid economic growth and increases in 
population, economic obsolescence has preceded physical obsolescence for many buildings 
several decades before the typical 99-year lease runs out. Moreover, the typical housing-
filtering process does not operate in Singapore because private housing does not filter to the 
middle-income segment of the market which is served by the HDB. In the case of privately 
owned properties, en bloc sales have facilitated redevelopment (Phang 2005). 
Until 1991, Singapore operated with two plans for land-use purposes: the Master Plan was 
statutory and revised every 5 years; the Concept Plan was approved but not released to the 
public (Dale 1999, 85). The 1990s was another period with regard to important policy 
decisions for physical land-use planning. The government adopted a more open approach to 
planning. A major review of the Concept Plan was completed and the revised plan was 
made public in 1991.     
The broad strategies of the 1991 Concept Plan were translated into a forward-looking Master 
Plan which has since been reviewed every 5 years.24 The development guide plans for 55 
planning areas contain the planning vision for its area, and sets out the control parameters 
such as land use, plot ratio, building height, provision of facilities, and amenities. Zoning and 
plot-ratio prescriptions contained within each development guide plan could deviate from the 
current land use with the objective of guiding the physical development in a specific planning 
area and “unlocking” the redevelopment potential of privately held land parcels.  
To take advantage of the increase in development potential arising from the above changes 
in planning regulations, the developer would have to pay a differential premium based on the 
development charge (which had been introduced in 1965.25 The Development Charge Table 
is updated by the Ministry of National Development in consultation with the Chief Valuer 
every 6 months (on 1 September and 1 March). The current prescribed average land rates 
are based on 70% of estimated land values by 8 land-use groups in 118 geographical 
sectors. In the case of leasehold land, developers are able to apply to top-up the land 
lease.26  
However, many of these sites were held under residential strata title, which, prior to 1999, 
required that all the strata-titled property owners must unanimously agree to a sale. Many 
sales had to be aborted when a minority (in some cases, just one) of the owners refused to 
24 The Master Plan can be accessed at https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/master-plan.aspx?p1=View-Master-Plan 
25 The Development Charge Table can be accessed at https://www.ura.gov.sg/uol/DC/apply-check-pay/apply-
permission/DC-rates-archive.aspx 
26 See the Singapore Land Authority web page for the document on “The Differential Premium System” at 
http://www.sla.gov.sg/Portals/0/Services/Land%20Lease%20Conditions/DP%20policy%20wef%2031%20Jul%
202000.pdf The topping-up of a lease tenure allows for a better Pareto optimum to be reached, as explained 
by Dale-Johnson (2001). The computation of the premium payable for the topping-up of lease tenure is 
assessed by the Chief Valuer on a case-by-case basis. 
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participate in the sale. Frustrated owners appealed to the government and, in 1999, the Land 
Titles (Strata) Act was amended to facilitate collective sales. The concerns of the majority 
were accepted by Parliament as legitimate and the actions of dissenting minority owners 
were described as “impeding efforts to maximize the development potential of en-bloc-sale 
sites and preventing the rejuvenation of older estates”.27   
In 1999, Parliament passed amendments to the Land Titles (Strata) Act that changed the 
100% requirement for en bloc sale to a majority vote. The new provisions applied to only 
strata developments with more than 10 units. Where a development is less than 10 years 
old, there must be 90% agreement; for developments 10 years old or more, at least 80% 
agreement suffices for collective sales (both figures based on share values). The Strata 
Titles Board reviews applications for collective sales. The Land Titles (Strata Titles Boards) 
Regulations 1999 sets out the procedure for applications to the board, the proceedings of 
the board, and other matters such as appeals to the board and the High Court. A study by 
Christudason (2010) shows that between 1999 and 2008, there were a total of 312 collective 
sales that resulted in 13,755 old private housing units being displaced by 35,888 new 
housing units. 
In the HDB sector, a spatial age gradient for HDB estates had become evident by the late 
1980s. As the city expanded outward from the central business district (CBD), older estates 
had been built closer to the CBD and new towns were built at distances further away. Also 
evident was the trend of younger families moving out of older HDB towns because they were 
allocated new flats in outlying new towns. In 1989, HDB upgrading programs to improve 
existing HDB estates were announced by the government. The upgrading programs vary in 
nature and scale and are substantially subsidized by the government (Centre for Liveable 
Cities 2013, 20). The government also launched the Selective En bloc Redevelopment 
Scheme (SERS) in 1995 under which older low-density blocks of HDB flats were acquired 
and demolished. From 1995 to 2014, 79 sites were redeveloped through the SERS. Affected 
households are resettled in new and higher-density housing with fresh 99-year leases within 
the same neighborhood.28 
Housing Wealth and Retirement Financing: The Lease Buyback Scheme 
In 2015, data from household sector balance sheets show housing assets owned by the 
resident household sector to be about 2.1 times GDP.29 The ratio of the net housing wealth 
to GDP was 1.5, while the ratio of the total net wealth to GDP was 3.8. The typical 
household in Singapore thus has a large fraction of its wealth invested in housing. However, 
housing wealth is illiquid and the study by McCarthy, Mitchell, and Piggott (2002) shows that 
the average worker in Singapore is often asset-rich but cash-poor upon retirement, as 75% 
of the retirement wealth is locked into housing assets. A report by the government-appointed 
Economic Review Committee (2002) came to a very similar conclusion.  
With a high homeownership rate and aging homeowners, there was a need for instruments 
through which households could monetize their housing asset (Phang 2015b). A local 
insurance firm, NTUC Income, was the first to introduce a reverse mortgage scheme for 
private housing in 1997. In 2006, a Singaporean bank, OCBC Bank launched a reverse 
mortgage scheme for owners of private property, and NTUC Income extended reverse 
mortgages to HDB homeowners. However, both institutions have since discontinued the 
schemes citing a lack of demand. Koh (2015) highlighted the lease system as the primary 
challenge for designing a viable reverse mortgage instrument. The instruments on offer 
27 See Report of the Select Committee on the Land Titles (Strata) (Amendment) Bill, presented to Parliament on 
19 April 1999. See Christudason (2010) for details of the legislation and the effects on private housing supply.  
28 See the HDB web page on the SERS at 
http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10329p.nsf/w/eSERSOverview?OpenDocument and the list of SERS sites (79 
sites) from 1995 to 2014 at http://www.teoalida.com/singapore/serslist/ 
29 See Department of Statistics web page at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/browse-by-theme/household-
sector-balance-sheet 
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stipulated that the property had to have at least 70 years of lease remaining to be eligible, 
with the condition that, at the end of the reverse mortgage, there had to be at least 50 years 
of lease remaining. 
To address the problem, the HDB introduced the Lease Buyback Scheme (LBS) in 2009 for 
low-income elderly (aged 63 or older) living in three-room or smaller flats. In 2014, the Prime 
Minister announced the enhancement of the LBS to four-room flats (H.L. Lee 2014). To 
illustrate, an HDB four-room flat, bought for approximately S$24,300 in 1980, lived in for 34 
years, is valued at S$450,000 in 2015. It can be retained for the next 30 years, and have the 
35 years of its end-lease purchased by the HDB in 2015 for S$190,000 to help finance the 
retirement of the now elderly homeowners. This is the provision of a retirement safety net 
based on ownership of an HDB flat, with the HDB taking on both interest-rate risk and 
housing price-depreciation risk over a long period of 30 years (Koh 2015). The housing 
price-depreciation risk is likely to be exacerbated by the homeowner’s disincentive to invest 
in flat renovation and maintenance as the property approaches the end of the retained lease 
period. Although this disincentive might be negligible for low-income households which may 
have less financial ability to meet these costs, it is likely to be significant for middle-income 
households. The impact of the disincentive would have increased substantially with the 
extension of the LBS to four-room flats.30  
Other monetization options that have been provided or made possible by the HDB for 
eligible elderly households include the following:  
- A Silver Housing Bonus incentive (of up to S$20,000) to sell their current flat and buy a 
smaller flat (right-sizing)  
- A related measure, the two-room Flexi Scheme, was introduced in 2015 which allows 
households, whose heads are over the age of 55, to buy two-room HDB flats on shorter 
leases than 99 years. The shorter lease means the price of the home is significantly 
reduced. The household can choose the lease duration to purchase, with the minimum 
duration dependent on the age of the household members.31 
- Subletting a room or putting their flat up for rental for a steady flow of income32   
8. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FOR OTHER 
ASIAN COUNTRIES 
Singapore’s housing system has evolved over time as a symbiotic relationship between the 
HDB and the CPF, with generous support from the Ministry of Finance. The HDB–CPF 
system has contributed to high savings and homeownership rates, and very effectively 
mobilized savings for housing and growth of housing loans. The provision of affordable 
housing has contributed to social stability, economic growth, and the development of 
communities. The large HDB sector with its regulations on ownership and resale contributes 
to reducing speculative demand for housing. The CPF rate adjustments, with their impacts 
on inflation and wage costs, have been useful as a macroeconomic instrument for a very 
open economy. It is not surprising that the HDB hosts numerous visits each year from 
foreign delegations wishing to learn from Singapore’s housing experience.  
30 The Enhanced LBS took effect in April 2015, and the HDB received 450 applications in April and May, of which 
214 were owners of four-room flats. A total of 965 households took up the LBS between 2009 and March 2015 
(The Straits Times, 12 June 2015). 
31 Shorter lease periods range from 15 to 45 years. Under the scheme, buyers must choose a lease period that 
will last them and their spouse until they are at least 95 years old. The two-room Flexi Scheme merges and 
replaces the two-room flat scheme and Studio Apartment (30-year lease) scheme. For details, see 
http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10321p.nsf/w/BuyingNewFlatEligibility2roomFlexiflats?OpenDocument. 
32 See H.L. Lee (2014) and HDB web page at 
http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10325p.nsf/w/MaxFinancesOverview?OpenDocument 
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Lessons that can be learned from the Singapore model of housing include the following: 
(i) Housing’s contribution to economic development: The housing and housing 
finance sectors can contribute positively and significantly to the economic and 
financial development of a country. Singapore’s macroeconomic environment has 
been one of high savings and income growth, low unemployment, inflation and 
interest rates, and government budgetary surpluses, as well as exchange rate 
appreciation. Housing policy has also been used to promote racial integration, which, 
in turn, has contributed to social stability and economic growth. 
(ii) Homeownership affordability: Establishing an integrated land, housing supply, and 
mortgage finance framework can deliver dramatic increases in housing supply and 
improvements in homeownership affordability.  
(iii) Urban governments: In urban areas, governments can greatly facilitate the speed of 
urban development and redevelopment through appropriate legislation, regulations, 
and institutions that enable increases in housing supply for a growing population. 
(iv) Private sector: Notwithstanding the importance of the government’s role in urban 
development and mobilization of domestic savings, financial institutions and private 
developers play an equally important role in the real estate sector. As markets 
mature, governments need to review policies periodically to assess their continued 
relevance. 
(v) Enabling markets: Markets are very important and creating and/or enabling markets 
to work more efficiently and allowing for private initiatives are very important aspects 
of housing policy. A symbiotic partnership between the government and private 
sector has helped Singapore to avoid the worst outcomes of the extremes of central 
planning and unplanned urbanization.  
(vi) Market transparency: Governments can play an important role in improving market 
transparency through provision of timely real estate market information.  
(vii) Housing subsidies: The short- and long-term implications of housing subsidies, 
explicit or implicit, supply- or demand-side, within the entire system, need to be fully 
understood and periodically reviewed for sustainability and effective housing market 
intervention.   
(viii) Macroprudential regulation: The government has deployed multiple mitigations in 
parallel to reduce the risk of housing becoming a source of financial sector instability. 
Housing markets are carefully segmented and carefully regulated. The main source 
of capital for housing finance comes from domestic savings. That these are in the 
form of compulsory savings lowers default risks.  
(ix) Monetizing housing assets: The CPF system has been used to mobilize pension 
fund savings for housing mortgage payments by young households. With an aging 
population, it is also necessary to design instruments for elderly homeowners to 
monetize housing assets for retirement financing. 
(x) Governance: The need for strong legislation and sound governance of housing 
agencies and financial institutions cannot be overemphasized. 
The system is not, however, without its critics and risks. The mandatory nature of the CPF, 
together with the dominance of the HDB, could have resulted in overallocation of resources 
to housing. The CPF collects from members more than what is required for housing. This 
could have crowded out consumption (Phang 2004) and, as CPF savings are illiquid, it has 
been cited as a reason behind a weak domestic start-up sector (Bhaskaran 2003). The large 
allocation of savings for housing and the risk of housing price declines pose risks for 
retirement financing (McCarthy, Mitchell, and Piggott 2002; Asher 2002; Phang 2007; Low 
2014). The phrase “asset rich and cash poor” neatly captures the basic problem, and 
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policies in the past decade to help aging households monetize their housing equity, provide 
health subsidies for the elderly, and workfare for lower-income workers represent steps 
toward a more comprehensive social security system.  
The affordable rental segment of Singapore’s housing market has also been marginalized by 
the deliberate and long-standing policy bias toward homeownership. The small proportion of 
HDB social rental housing comprises mostly one- and two-room flats that house low-income 
families.33 There is generally a shortage of affordable market rental units in the HDB sector 
as evident by the higher rental yield for HDB flats as compared with private housing. With 
the increase in the foreign population in Singapore, there is a need to expand the affordable 
rental sector. One suggestion is to establish housing real estate investment trusts to help 
cater to the rental housing needs of an increasing number of SPRs and foreigners in 
Singapore as well as Singaporean households in transition (Phang 2013b; Phang et al. 
2014).  
While the Singapore model has attracted much interest from other Asian countries 
(Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2014), the transferability of Singapore’s experience to other 
countries needs to be juxtaposed with the local political and social context. In the housing 
policy sphere, a housing provident fund is relatively simple to set up if designed as a savings 
and payments institution. The more complex institution to replicate is the HDB, in particular 
its resettlement, town planning, and estate management capabilities, as well as attention to 
developing good-quality affordable housing on a large scale. Moreover, the tactics on which 
Singapore relies—compulsory savings, state land ownership, and state provision of 
housing—can easily spawn widespread inefficiency and corruption in other sociopolitical 
contexts.   
 
  
33 The government recognizes the need to support low-income households renting one- and two-room HDB flats. 
The reasons for their financial hardship are often social in nature, and community support workers provide 
support to these households. In the National Day address in August 2015, the Prime Minister introduced a 
Fresh Start Housing Scheme meant to help households that have sold their homes and subsequently cannot 
afford a new home. 
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Singapore government agency websites:  
 Housing & Development Board at www.hdb.gov.sg  
 Central Provident Fund at www.cpf.gov.sg  
 Urban Redevelopment Authority at www.ura.gov.sg  
 Singapore Land Authority at www.sla.gov.sg  
 Department of Statistics at www.singstat.gov.sg   
 Inland Revenue Authority at www.iras.gov.sg  
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